Key Points
- 27th Constitutional Amendment creates unprecedented internal tension within Pakistan Army over broken command rotation system
- Traditional three-year rotation of commanders shattered as Asim Munir gains permanent position with lifelong immunity
- Senior generals’ decades-long career aspirations destroyed, creating fears of first-ever open rebellion within military
- Pakistan Army facing morale crisis with reports of resignations, desertion requests under Munir’s leadership since April 2025
- Historical precedent shows long-term military rulers met disastrous ends: Zia-ul-Haq died in plane crash, Musharraf died in exile
- Amendment reduces civilian government to formality, hands complete control to Army General Headquarters
- Lawyers warn amendment creates “constitutionalized military supremacy” destroying institutional balance permanently
- Power struggle between factions loyal to Munir and former generals Faiz Hameed, Qamar Javed Bajwa intensifying
- Weak economy, political instability, public discontent compound crisis potentially leading to intra-military power change
- Pakistan’s joint chiefs system where all service chiefs were equal completely destroyed under new structure
New Delhi: The passage of Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment on November 12, 2025, has triggered a crisis that strikes at the heart of the military’s institutional structure, a carefully calibrated three-year rotation system for commanders that has governed the Pakistan Army for decades. This rotation mechanism forms the foundation of the entire officer career structure, providing predictability and hope to senior commanders who spend their entire professional lives calculating when their turn for top positions will arrive.
Under the traditional system, every general knew approximately when he could expect promotion to key command positions, including the ultimate prize of Army Chief, typically a three-year appointment followed by retirement. This predictability maintained institutional stability, prevented the concentration of power in any single individual, and ensured generational turnover that kept the military hierarchy dynamic and responsive to evolving strategic challenges.
The 27th Amendment shatters this fundamental compact by creating the position of Chief of Defence Forces with lifelong tenure and immunity, effectively allowing Asim Munir to refuse retirement indefinitely. For senior generals who have spent 30 to 35 years climbing the ranks with the expectation of eventually reaching the top, this represents not merely a career disappointment but the destruction of the institutional promise that motivated their entire professional lives.
Unprecedented Fears of Internal Rebellion
For the first time in Pakistan’s 78-year history, credible fears of open discontent and potential rebellion within the Pakistan Army have emerged, a development that security analysts describe as unprecedented even in a military known for its involvement in coups against civilian governments. The crucial difference is that previous military interventions targeted civilian administrations, whereas current tensions involve internal military hierarchy and power distribution.
Constitutional law experts note that the amendment creates a scenario where senior generals face a stark choice: accept permanent subordination to Munir regardless of their own seniority and accomplishments, or challenge the institutional structure through either political maneuvering or more confrontation. The latter option carries enormous personal and professional risks but may seem increasingly attractive to officers who see their life’s ambitions permanently blocked.
Intelligence sources cited in Pakistani media reports suggest that informal discussions among senior commanders have intensified since the amendment’s passage, with some generals expressing private fury at what they perceive as a betrayal of the military’s institutional norms. While no open challenge has materialized as of mid-November 2025, observers warn that such rebellions typically develop covertly before suddenly erupting when conditions become favorable or when key actors decide they have nothing left to lose.
Morale Crisis: Resignations and Desertion Requests
The internal crisis extends beyond senior generals to affect officer morale throughout the Pakistan Army’s ranks. Reports from April 2025 revealed an unprecedented wave of resignation and desertion requests, with a leaked advisory from the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) acknowledging the surge and warning all ranks about strict action under the Pakistan Army Act of 1952 for unauthorized departures.
The leaked document attributed the unrest to fears of an all-out war with India following the Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians, but analysts suggest the morale problems run deeper, reflecting broader dissatisfaction with General Munir’s leadership style and strategic decisions. Military officers were directed to conduct “darbars” (assemblies) to uphold the army’s oath and boost troop morale, an acknowledgment that normal command channels had proven insufficient to address the crisis.
The morale collapse is particularly striking in traditional Pakistan Army recruitment areas including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces. Military analyst Moeed Pirzada noted that “for the first time, the Pakistan Army is extremely unpopular in its traditional support areas like KP and Punjab, which also happen to be the breeding ground for its soldiers and officers.” This geographic dimension suggests that the leadership crisis is compounded by the military’s declining public legitimacy.
Power Struggle Between Military Factions
The constitutional changes have intensified an ongoing power struggle between factions loyal to current Army Chief Asim Munir and those aligned with former generals, particularly Faiz Hameed and Qamar Javed Bajwa. This factional conflict predates the 27th Amendment but has been dramatically sharpened by the stakes involved in permanent control versus potential marginalization.
General Faiz Hameed, the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, maintains significant support within intelligence and special operations communities, while General Bajwa, who appointed Munir as Army Chief in November 2022, retains influence among officers who served under him during his tenure. The 27th Amendment effectively ends any possibility of these factions regaining institutional power through normal rotation, potentially pushing them toward more confrontational strategies.
Boston University professor Adil Najam characterized the situation as “the biggest institutional crisis that the military has ever faced in Pakistan,” noting that “it is not just that their strategy failed. It’s that the ability of the military to define Pakistan’s politics is now in question.” This loss of political control, combined with internal factional struggles, creates conditions where desperate actors might attempt high-risk maneuvers.
Historical Warning: Fate of Long-Term Military Rulers
Pakistan’s history offers ominous precedents for military rulers who overstay their welcome, a reality not lost on senior generals contemplating the implications of Munir’s permanent ascendancy. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who seized power in 1977 and laid the foundation for Pakistan’s Islamization, ruled for 11 years before dying in a mysterious C-130 Hercules plane crash on August 17, 1988, that also killed the US Ambassador and several senior Pakistani generals.
The circumstances of Zia’s death remain disputed, with theories ranging from mechanical failure to sabotage by his own generals, foreign intelligence agencies, or domestic opposition groups. What remains undisputed is that his long tenure created numerous enemies within and outside the military establishment, and his sudden, violent death became a cautionary tale about the dangers of concentrated military power.
General Pervez Musharraf’s fate provides a more recent warning. After seizing power in a 1999 coup against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and ruling for nine years, Musharraf eventually fled into exile in 2008, facing treason charges for imposing emergency rule and suspending the Constitution. He was convicted of high treason in 2019 and sentenced to death in absentia, though the sentence was later overturned. Musharraf died in Dubai in February 2023, ill and isolated, having spent his final years unable to return to Pakistan.
Civilian Government Reduced to Formality
The 27th Amendment completes a process that has effectively reduced Pakistan’s civilian government to ceremonial status, with all substantive power concentrated in the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. With Imran Khan imprisoned since August 2023, the opposition effectively eliminated through arrests and intimidation, and the military exercising indirect control over the judiciary and media, the amendment formalizes what had been informal military dominance.
Osama Malik, an Islamabad-based lawyer, warned that “this constitutional amendment will increase authoritarianism and whatever little semblance of democracy existed in this country will fade away.” He noted that the changes “will not only remove civilian oversight from the military’s activities, but it will also destroy the military hierarchy where all service chiefs were considered equal under the joint chief system.”
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Secretary General Salman Akram Raja described the amendment as “deeply undemocratic at its core,” noting that “they have given lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution to the president and created a system that concentrates power in one military office.” PTI spokesman Sayed Zulfikar Bukhari called it “the final nail in the coffin of an independent judiciary and a functioning democracy.”
Economic Crisis Compounds Political Instability
The military’s internal crisis unfolds against a backdrop of severe economic distress that further destabilizes Pakistan’s political environment. The country faces mounting external debt, depleted foreign exchange reserves, persistent inflation, and recurring balance of payments crises that require repeated International Monetary Fund bailouts with stringent conditions.
Public discontent over economic hardship has manifested in mass protests demanding Imran Khan’s release and restoration of democratic processes. The military’s traditional strategy of maintaining legitimacy through delivering economic growth and security has failed spectacularly, with citizens in urban centers experiencing regular power cuts, food price inflation, and declining living standards.
This economic fragility means that any internal military power struggle could rapidly escalate into a broader state crisis. Unlike previous periods when military rulers could rely on public acquiescence or foreign support, current conditions offer little cushion against political shocks. The combination of economic crisis, public anger, and internal military tensions creates a potentially explosive mixture.
International Dimensions and Nuclear Concerns
Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed nation with an estimated 170 warheads adds a dangerous international dimension to the internal military crisis. The 27th Amendment grants the Chief of Defence Forces control over the Commander of National Strategic Command, who oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, concentrating both conventional and nuclear authority in Munir’s hands.
International security analysts express concern that internal power struggles within a nuclear-armed military could create unpredictable command and control scenarios. If rival military factions reached open confrontation, questions about who actually controls Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and under what authorization they might be deployed would create serious regional and global security risks.
The United States, which has complex relationships with both Pakistan’s civilian governments and military establishment, faces difficult policy choices. President Donald Trump’s characterization of Munir as his “favorite field marshal” suggests American acceptance of military dominance, but internal Pakistani military instability could force Washington to recalculate its strategic approach to a nuclear-armed country sliding toward potential military civil war.
Potential Scenarios for Internal Military Change
Multiple scenarios could lead to the first internal military power change in Pakistan’s history, each carrying different implications for the country’s stability and regional security. The most conventional would involve senior generals coordinating to pressure Munir into retirement through institutional channels, citing concerns about military cohesion and the need to restore the rotation system.
A more dramatic scenario involves a faction-led coup against Munir, potentially justified as restoring the military’s institutional integrity and removing an officer who has violated sacred norms. Such a coup would be unprecedented as an internal military overthrow rather than a military takeover of civilian government, and its success would depend on control of key units, particularly the Special Services Group and formations near Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
The darkest scenario involves prolonged factional conflict within the military that paralyzes the institution and potentially fragments command structures along personal loyalty lines. This could create conditions where civilian politicians, long subordinated to military authority, might attempt to reassert control, or where external actors could exploit internal military divisions to advance their strategic interests.
Timeline Uncertainty and Warning Signs
Analysts emphasize that predicting when internal military tensions might erupt into open confrontation remains extremely difficult, as such developments typically occur suddenly after long periods of covert preparation. However, several warning signs could indicate escalating crisis: unusual troop movements near key installations, sudden retirements or dismissals of senior generals, changes in intelligence agency leadership, or public statements by retired military officers criticizing current leadership.
The constitutional structure created by the 27th Amendment means that any successful challenge to Munir would require either constitutional amendment through a two-thirds parliamentary vote, which seems impossible given military control over legislators, or extra-constitutional action that would openly violate the recently enacted framework. The latter option creates legal and political complications even for military actors accustomed to operating above the law.
Point of No Return for Pakistani Democracy
For many observers of Pakistani politics, the 27th Amendment represents a point of no return in the country’s troubled relationship between civilian and military authority. Unlike previous periods of military rule that maintained the fiction of temporary intervention with eventual return to democracy, the constitutional enshrinement of military supremacy with lifelong immunity eliminates even theoretical accountability.
The amendment’s passage with only four dissenting votes in a 342-member National Assembly demonstrates the complete subordination of elected representatives to military preferences. The speed of passage without meaningful debate or public consultation showed that Pakistan’s parliament functions as a rubber stamp for decisions made at military headquarters, not as a genuine legislative body representing popular sovereignty.
Whether future generations of Pakistanis will find ways to reverse this constitutional coup and restore democratic governance, or whether the country has permanently embraced military dictatorship operating under constitutional cover, remains one of the most consequential questions facing South Asia. For now, the more immediate question is whether the military itself can survive the internal contradictions created by destroying its own institutional norms in the service of one man’s permanent rule.
